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Do We Have It Right This Time? An Analysis of
the Accomplishments and Shortcomings of
Washington’s Indian Child Welfare Act
Karen Gray Young
I. INTRODUCTION
Jessie Scheibner’s eyes cloud with tears and her voice trembles as
she talks about the day, almost 70 years ago, when a stranger’s car
pulled up to her parents’ home on the Port Gamble S’Klallam
Reservation and took her and her two sisters away.
The memories of that car ride when she was three and the years
spent in one foster home after another are hazy. Foster care was
difficult enough, but Scheibner, now 72, clearly recalls being
ashamed of her dark hair, brown skin, and Indian American roots
as she bounced from home to home off the reservation.1
Governmental removal of Indian2 children from their families has had
devastating results for native tribes across the nation. Washington State is
no exception. The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was passed in
1978 as a mechanism to prevent this long-standing practice, and the success


Karen Gray Young is a 2013 graduate of the Seattle University School of Law. She
received her BA in English Literature from Western Washington University. A special
thanks to the women who inspired and championed this piece: Heidi K. Adams, Katie
Jones, Margaret Lerfald, and Laurie Gray. Most importantly, this article is dedicated to
our social workers and the communities they so valiantly serve.
1
Jennifer Sullivan, Tribe Takes Control of Child Welfare From State, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017861071_portgamble29m.
html.
2
This article will utilize the term “Indian” when referring to Native Americans and
first-nation people because this is the specific legal term utilized in both the ICWA and
WICWA. See Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.38 (2011).
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(or failure) of the ICWA has been evaluated and discussed on a national
level since coming into effect.3 However, it is at the state level where the
success of the ICWA can be most directly evaluated and, conversely, its
failure most concretely demonstrated.
In 1993, Kim Laree Schnuelle addressed the application and implications
of the ICWA on Washington’s child removal policies and procedures in her
article titled “When the Bough Breaks: Federal and Washington State
Indian Child Welfare Law and Its Application.”4 Schnuelle argued, “both
the federal [ICWA] and the Washington [ICWA] law suffer from
incomplete, vague language and serious problems of noncompliance in the
field.”5 In the end, she concluded “the Washington State Indian Child
Welfare Manual [the most current guidance on the ICWA at the time] has
attempted to clarify the law in this area, but more is needed to enforce
compliance and to fully protect Indian children.”6
In May 2011, in response to similar demands for greater ICWA
compliance from scholars and Washington child welfare advocates, the
Washington legislature adopted the provisions of the ICWA as state law by
passing the Washington Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA).7 Through
passage of this act, the legislature attempted to create better understanding
about, and adherence to, the federal ICWA.8 Whether the WICWA will
actually generate such compliance and address Schnuelle’s call for
clarification and improvement is the central question of this article.
The WICWA is generally intended to do the following:
3

Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993); Legislative History of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND,
http://www.narf.org/icwa/federal/lh.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
4
Kim Larree Schnuelle, When the Bough Breaks: Federal and Washington State Indian
Child Welfare Law and its Application, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 101(1993).
5
Id. at 138.
6
Id.
7
WASH. REV. CODE §13.38 (2011); S.B. 5656, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
8
WASH. REV. CODE §13.38 (2011); S.B. 5656, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
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1.

Clarify Washington’s interpretation of the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act;
2. Assure quicker, more accurate identification of Indian children in the
child welfare system;
3. Assure consistent application and enforcement of the federal ICWA;
4. Assure that existing policies, practices, and agreements, developed
over the last thirty years between the State and the tribal nations of
Washington are the benchmarks against which federal ICWA
compliance is measured; and
5. Better define the types of “child custody” cases affected by federal and
[s]tate Indian child welfare laws.9
Specifically, the language of the WICWA, which includes the “active
efforts” standard for agencies and agency social workers,” states that
Washington is “committed to protecting the essential tribal relations and
best interests of Indian children by promoting practices designed to prevent
out-of-home placement of Indian children that is inconsistent with the rights
of the parents, the health, safety, or welfare of the children, or the interests
of their tribe.”10 WICWA advocates and supporters hope that education on
the Act’s provisions, as well as “its vigorous enforcement will help
substantially reduce the persistent disproportiona[tly] high presence of
Indian children in all levels and aspects of Washington’s child welfare
system.”11
The need for clear and applicable ICWA provisions at the state and
federal level has never been greater. The application and implementation of
the ICWA and its unique provisions and specifications on the child welfare
system is particularly relevant due to the correlation between child welfare
9

New Indian Child Welfare Act, NW. JUSTICE PROJECT, http://nwjustice.org/newindian-child-welfare-act (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
10
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.38.030 (2011).
11
NW. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 9.
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issues and the economic health of families and communities.12 As the
national and regional economy “continues to downward spiral, more and
more families will face economic hardship and more will fall into
poverty.”13 In particular, several studies have demonstrated children living
in poverty are more likely to become involved with Child Protective
Services (CPS).14
This article will attempt to address several questions about this issue.
First, will Washington’s adoption of the ICWA into state law accomplish its
goal? Second, have the problems with the ICWA’s implementation in
Washington, as specifically outlined by Schnuelle in her article, been
addressed? Third, will the recent passage of WICWA fill the current
compliance gaps, move Washington toward greater ICWA adherence, and
ultimately protect Indian children? Last, will the definitional clarifications
in the WICWA, particularly regarding the “active efforts” standard that
agency social workers must meet in order to remove an Indian child from
their home, bring actual clarity to the government’s heightened duty in
ICWA proceedings? If not, what further action is needed?
It is my assertion that while the new statutory language in the WICWA is
somewhat helpful for statutory interpretation, in that it provides some
definitional clarity, particularly in the “best interests of the child,” many
terms remain ambiguous. In particular, it is unclear what actions would
fulfill the “active efforts” requirement by governmental social workers.
Without this critical clarification from the legislature, the WICWA still runs

12
See Amanda Tucker, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Unconstitutional Impact on the
Welfare of the Indian Child, 9 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 87 (2009).
13
Id. (quoting JANE BURSTAIN, THE CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE 2010-11 BUDGET AND
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 81ST LEGIS. 2 (Tex. 2009),
available at http://library.cppp.org/files/4/burstainCPS.pdf).
14
Id.
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a great risk of widespread non-compliance, ultimately harming the very
population the Act is designed to protect—Indian children.
This comment will analyze the accomplishments and shortcomings of the
WICWA by first reviewing the history and national policy for the original
ICWA, focusing in particular on Washington’s application and
interpretation of this federal statue. Next, the reasons for the initial passage
of the ICWA will be addressed, particularly as a response to the longstanding and evasive government policy of removing Indian children from
their families. Then, this comment will discuss how the ICWA has been
applied and complied with, generally, by various states since its passage,
focusing specifically on Washington State. This comment will then explore
the recently enacted WICWA, including Washington’s legislative intent,
and the statute’s new definitions. Finally, this comment will discuss
whether these definitions are adequate, for the purpose of keeping Indian
children with their families to the greatest extent possible.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Foundations of Federal Indian Law
Legislation relating to Indians must adhere to the basic legal principles
that make up the canon of federal Indian law, as articulated in the US
Constitution and various nineteenth century US Supreme Court cases
explaining the US government’s relationship with Indian tribes.15
Therefore, a brief discussion of these fundamental principles is necessary.
In the original US Constitution, Indians are mentioned twice: (1) where
Indians are excluded from federal representation figures, and (2) under the
Commerce Clause, where Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce
15

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); Worchester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 595 (1832); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
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with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes.”16 This last provision has been the foundation for Congressional
power over Indian affairs, and it forms the legal basis for Congress’ plenary
power over matters involving Indians.17 Additionally, tribal sovereignty is
an important concept in this discussion, and is imperative to understanding
the ICWA. Tribal sovereignty is based on the inherent authority of Indian
tribes to self-govern.18 This authority is subordinate only to the federal, not
state, government.19
Two of the most important US Supreme Court cases outlining federal
power over the Indian tribes are Worchester v. Georgia20 and Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.21 In Worchester, the question before the Court was the
validity of a prison sentence imposed on a non-Indian individual by the
state of Georgia for entering Cherokee land without state permission.22 The
Court found the state law, which extended state jurisdiction to Indian land,
to be invalid.23 Chief Justice John Marshall articulated several core tenants
of federal law as it relates to the Indian tribes.24 He reasoned that the US
Constitution delegates power over Indian affairs to the federal government
and withholds this power from the individual states.25 Furthermore, Justice
16

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2
(“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17
The phrase “plenary power” comes from the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Morton
v. Mancari: there exists “a plenary power of congress, based on a history of treaties and
the assumption of a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized
Indian tribes.” Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
18
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
19
Id, at 595.
20
Id.
21
The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
22
Worchester, 31 U.S. at 515.
23
Id. at 595.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 535.
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Marshall reasoned that that the tribes retain their sovereign powers unless,
and until, Congress chooses to take these powers away.26 Under this
rationale, the tribe’s power is derived from inherent sovereign power as
“distinct, independent political communities” that predate the federal
government.27 However, the federal government, as the ultimate authority
over the tribes, retains the sole power to erode this tribal sovereign
authority.28
In Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall further described the dynamic of
the Indian tribes and their sovereignty dynamic in the United States.29
Justice Marshall defined the Indian tribes as “domestic dependent
nations.”30 Additionally, he described the “guardian-ward” relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes in which the government
has the duty to act as a “guardian” for the tribes.31 In this manner, Justice
Marshall articulated the specific role of the federal government in
protecting tribes from encroaching on state government power. These
dueling concepts create a unique and complicated legal landscape for tribes.
On the one hand, tribes are recognized as “nations” and have areas of
authority and sovereignty, such as forming a government, determining tribal
membership, regulating domestic relations, and participating in commerce
and trade.32 On the other hand, Congress, through its plenary power in the
26

Id. at 538.
Id. at 559.
28
Id. at 595.
29
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
30
Id. at 2.
31
Id. at 17.
32
See Worchester, 31 U.S. at 515; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1; see also Frequently
asked questions, US DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs (“Tribes possess all powers of self-government except those
relinquished under treaty with the United States, those that Congress has expressly
extinguished, and those that federal courts have ruled are subject to existing federal law
or are inconsistent with overriding national policies. Tribes, therefore, possess the right to
form their own governments; to make and enforce laws, both civil and criminal; to tax; to
establish and determine membership (i.e., tribal citizenship); to license and regulate
27
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Constitution, has been given the right to protect and preserve Indian tribes
and their resources, including Indian children.33
Therefore, a strong tension exists between the inherent sovereignty of the
Indian tribes and the encroaching sovereignty and power of the federal and
state governments. In this tension, tribal authority is often enhanced by
federal Congressional Acts. The ICWA is an example of such an
enhancement.
B. Indian Children Removal
In order to understand the intended impact of the ICWA and the WICWA
on dependency proceedings, it is important to understand the history and
conditions that led to the 1978 passage of the ICWA. Predominately, the
United States has a long and painful history of attempted Indian
assimilation into Anglo-Christian culture.34 Of particular focus in this
pursuit has been the systematic separation of Indian children from their
families.35
This trend of separation and removal began in the nineteenth century
during a time period many academics refer to as the “Removal Era”
because government agencies implemented devastating policies intended to
quash tribal culture.36 The first recorded instances of Indian child removal
from Indian communities date back to the Creek Wars, fought from 1813 to
1815, when future US President Andrew Jackson housed and cared for an

activities within their jurisdiction; to zone; and to exclude persons from tribal lands.”)
(last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
33
25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993).
34
See MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 2 (2001).
35
Id.
36
See Dewi Ioan Ball, Williams v. Lee 50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One of the
Most Important Cases in the Modern-Era of Federal Indian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 391, 412 (2010); Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political
Rights As Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1045 (2011).
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Indian toddler whose parents had been killed by American troops.37 The
young boy lived with the Jackson family and was intended to be a playmate
for Jackson’s son.38 The Indian boy received an education and learned a
trade before dying at sixteen.39 Jackson’s Secretary of War also “adopted”
an Indian child who had been orphaned during the Creek Wars; however,
after three years in the home, the boy escaped.40 The Secretary’s wife wrote
to a friend stating that “I never saw him afterwards; but we heard of him. . .
. [He] had found his own people.”41
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the fields of sociology and social
work emerged in social science academia and quickly inserted their familial
values on Indian families and communities. Within these professional
disciplines, an increasingly hostile worldview developed towards
communities, including Indian tribes, who “failed to function within the
parameters of white, middle-class expectations.”42 Social workers, backed
by state and local governments, felt compelled to invade families out of a
“scared obligation” to intercede in non-white, non-middle-class families.43
Out of this “sacred obligation,” physical removal of children from these
families to government institutions became increasingly popular.44 In 1890,
there were 60,981 children under the age of sixteen in government
institutions; in 1923, the number rose to 204,888.45 The majority of these
children had at least one living parent.46

37

MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 2 (2001).
Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 3.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 4.
46
Id.
38
39

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013

1238 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

As part of Removal Era policy, many states also sent thousands of Indian
children to “boarding schools” in an attempt to educate and transform
Indian children “into productive members of the dominant white culture.”47
These schools served as a core tenant of the US assimilation policy to
“destroy” the children’s ties to their tribal identities.48 Indian children were
thus “harshly treated, punished for speaking their own language, and
consistently instructed to purge themselves of all traces of Indian culture.”49
An army officer by the name of Richard Pratt founded many of these
boarding schools in the nineteenth century, basing the education curriculum
on a program he had developed for Indian prisons.50 Pratt described his
philosophy for these schools in a speech when he stated, “a great general
has said that the only good Indian is a dead one. In a sense, I agree with the
sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be
dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.”51
The legacy of this destructionist sentiment continued for decades. In a
case from 1945, Bill Wright, a Pattwin Indian, was sent to the Stewart
Indian School in Nevada when he was just six years old.52 Wright recalls,
“students at [the] boarding schools were forbidden to express their
culture—everything from wearing long hair to speaking even a single
Indian word.”53 In fact, Wright lost both his language and his Indian
name.54 He stated:

47

Id. at 14.
Id.
49
Schnuelle, supra note 4.
50
Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NPR, May 12, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16516865.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
48
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I can remember coming home and my grandma asked me to talk
Indian to her. I said, “Grandma, I don’t understand you,” and she
said, “Then who are you?”
I told her my name is Billy. “Your name’s not Billy. Your name’s
‘TAH-rruhm,” she said. And I went, “That’s not what they told
me.”55
Wright’s experiences demonstrate the boarding schools’ singular goal—
assimilating Indian children into white, Anglo-Christian culture.
While boarding schools greatly contributed to the disconnection between
Indian children and their families and culture, an even larger component of
this assimilation policy was the placement of Indian children with nonIndian adoptive families or in non-Indian foster homes.56 In particular,
Indian women who gave birth out of wedlock were targeted by government
social workers as candidates for child removal out of moral judgment.57
This policy focused on the following notion:
[A] woman who chose not to marry and keep her child was
considered flawed and weak because she rejected society’s
willingness to “rehabilitate” her by lettering her put the child up
for adoption and ‘start over’ as if nothing had happened. In the
1950s, sociologists began to survey and analyze women who were
unwed and pregnant. After administering a battery of tests to
residents at homes for unwed mothers, one sociologist used his
‘interpretive impressions’ to declare that women who kept
children, when they were unwed, were emotionally and mentally
immature. It was a white, middle-class interpretative impression
that permeated the social worker mind-set. When social pressure
combined with poverty and limited economic prospects, a young
woman was primed for placing her child up for adoption.58

55
56
57
58

Id.
HOLT, supra note 34, at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
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Such removal, through adoption, was largely based on the idea held by both
public and private child welfare agencies that “Indian children would be
better off growing up non-Indian.”59
Social workers were also able to remove Indian children from Indian
families “based on something as dubious as ‘immoral conduct,’ which
included actions like illicit co-habitation” and other Indian cultural
markers.60 During the 1968 ICWA hearings, William Byler, the Executive
Director of the Association of American Indian Affairs, explained the
practice of removing Indian children from “co-habitation” environments.61
Byler explained that on one reservation, more than 50 percent of the people
lived in these common-law situations,62 with unions lasting five to fifteen
years.63 Police sometimes made a sweep of an entire reservation, arresting
those living in illicit cohabitation environments,64 and removing their
children.65
Additionally, social workers often cited problems, such as insufficient
housing space and caretaking of an Indian child by a “distant relative,” as
examples of child abuse.66 However, the size of a particular home or the
caretaking role by other members of the tribe is largely based on cultural
custom and not issues of neglect.67
Overall, Mr. Byler’s example illustrates how people tasked with making
child neglect determinations, such as state social workers, commonly
viewed Indian child cases through the lens of Anglo American middle-class
59

Megan Scanlon, Comment, From Theory to Practice: Incorporating the “Active
Efforts” Requirement in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629,
631 (Summer 2011).
60
Id. at 632.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Do We Have It Right This Time? 1241

values and ignored Indian culture and familial structures.68 This viewpoint
was terribly destructive to Indian tribes.
In the 1960s, tribes began to fight back against removal of Indian
children from their communities as statistics about the pervasive and
widespread nature of this practice began to emerge. In 1969 and 1974, the
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) “estimated that between
25 and 35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families
and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.”69 On a
national level, “one out of every four children of Indian American heritage
was separated from family by the mid-1970s, and Indian children were
twenty times more likely than non-Indian children to be placed in foster
care.”70 In the 1977 congressional hearings before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, it was confirmed that 25 percent of all Indian children were
being raised in non-Indian homes or institutions.71 In fact, when adoption
placements were created for these Indian children, between 75 and 93
percent were placed with non-Indian families.72
The extent of child removal varied from state to state. In Minnesota, from
1971 to 1972, one in every eight Indian children under eighteen years of
age lived in a non-Indian adoptive home, while one in every four Indian
children under one year of age had been adopted by non-Indian families.73
Similarly, in Montana, “Indian children were thirteen times more likely to
be put into foster care and adoptive placements than non-Indians.”74 In
South Dakota, “Indian children were sixteen times more likely than non68

HOLT, supra note 34, at 5.
Id. at 4–5.
70
Id.
71
John Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations
on the Federal Power Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 142 (1992).
72
Id. at 142–43.
73
Marcia Yablon, The Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2003, 38 FAM. L. Q.
689, 691 (2004).
74
Id.
69

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013

1242 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Indians” to be living in foster care.75 Furthermore, it was determined that,
while the South Dakota Indian population in 1960 was 3.6 percent of the
total population, 50 percent of all children in South Dakota foster care were
Indian.76
In Washington, in the 1960s and 1970s, nineteen times as many Indian
children were in adoptive homes than non-Indian children, and Indian
children were placed in foster care ten times more regularly than non-Indian
children.77 In response to these staggering numbers, the congressional
report on Indian child welfare during the passage of the ICWA stated, “the
whole separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most
tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”78
The removal of Indian children from Indian families had a direct and
profound impact on the tribes themselves. Indian tribes publically addressed
these tragic separations in the years leading up to the enactment of the
ICWA, contributing to the eventual passage of the ICWA. In the late 1960s,
the Devils Lake Sioux in North Dakota brought their concerns about child
removal policies to the AAIA.79 Other North Dakota tribes, the Standing
Rock Sioux and the Three Affiliated Tribes (Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara
Nation), joined this effort in the early 1970s.80 The Chief of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians testified in the 1978 ICWA Senate hearings that
“culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our
children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are
75

Id.
HOLT, supra note 34, at 5.
77
Schnuelle, supra note 4, at 104.
78
Yablon, supra note 73.
79
B.J. JONES ET AL., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A PILOT STUDY OF COMPLIANCE IN
NORTH DAKOTA 9 (2000), available at http://www.nicwa.org/research/04.ICWA.pdf
[hereinafter, JONES ET AL., A PILOT STUDY]; Indian Child Welfare Act in California,
CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVICES, http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/pg1322.htm (last visited
Feb. 11, 2013).
80
JONES ET AL., A PILOT STUDY, supra note 79, at 9.
76
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raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their
People.”81 With 25 to 35 percent of Indian children placed with non-Indian
families between 1969 and 1974, this practice was termed by some as a
form of “cultural genocide.”82

III. THE ICWA’S PASSAGE, TERMS, AND COMPLIANCE
When Congress passed the ICWA in 1978, the national political climate
was ripe for societal change and social justice. In accordance with society’s
changes, the values of self-determination and preservation began to
influence Congressional interactions with the Indian nations.83 Congress
enacted the ICWA in hopes that its specific provisions would sufficiently
alter the relationship between the government and Indian tribes so that,
while Indian children would still be adequately protected through CPS and
dependency proceedings, these children would no longer be needlessly
removed from their families, tribes, and native culture in the pursuit of
assimilation.84
After its passage, the US Supreme Court clarified ICWA’s goals and its
corresponding provisions in only one case—Mississippi v. Holyfield.85
Because of this minimal history of interpretation, agency understanding of
the ICWA and its provisions has continued to be problematic as child
protective agencies struggle to clarify its terms, particularly the mandate of

81

Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (2008).
82
ANDREA WILKINS, STATE-TRIBAL COOPERATION AND THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT (July 2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/statetribe/ICWABrief08.pdf.
83
HOLT, supra note 34, at 2.
83
Id.
84
Indian Children Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012).
85
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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“active efforts” by social workers.86 Therefore, ICWA compliance has
continued to significantly hinder Congress’ original ICWA aspirations.87
In order to combat these problems and provide useful, workable
guidelines for agencies to follow, the terms of the ICWA and WICWA must
be concrete, tangible, and quantifiably measured.
A. The Theory Behind ICWA: A Season of Self-Determination
Throughout US history, the federal government has implemented various
policies and philosophies regarding the relationship between the Indian
tribes and the US government. From 1945 to 1961, prior to the passage of
the ICWA, and during the time period when the most significant Indian
child removal transpired, the federal government was operating under its
“termination theory.”88 Under this theory, the government had a policy of
eroding tribal culture, structure, and sovereignty with the ultimate goal of
terminating the tribes.89 During this period, 109 Indian tribes were removed
from federal recognition and 1.3 million acres of Indian land were lost.90
However, as a result of several shifts in the US governmental and
political landscape, including the increasingly popular and important civil
rights movements of the 1960s, the US government’s policy towards Indian
tribes moved from termination to self-determination.91 Under this new
philosophy, the federal government would theoretically have less control
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and less intervention in Indian affairs.92 However, at the same time, the
federal government still maintained its “guardian-ward” trust relationship to
the tribes as outlined in the Marshall cases from the nineteenth century.93
The ICWA was enacted in 1978 as a result of this tension.94 The Act
“wove itself around the fundamental question of a culture’s right to its own
children and the ways in which the dominant culture enforced its child
welfare and parental custodial statutes.”95 The ICWA is a paramount
example of the tension between Congress’s intent and responsibility to treat
Indian tribes as independent, self-governing bodies, and the dependency the
tribes have on the federal government’s economic, political, and legal
support.96
B. Goals of the ICWA
In response to alarming rates of Indian children being removed from their
families, Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 with the goal of implementing
“a national policy to protect the best interest of Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”97 To
achieve these goals, the ICWA established a series of minimum federal
standards for situations involving the removal of an Indian child from his or
her family, and regulations for the placement of such a child in foster or
adoptive homes.98 Additionally, Indian tribes were made parties to the
dependency proceedings and given standing.99 As a result, when a state
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agency removes an Indian child from his or her biological family, the
potential for loss of cultural ties to the Indian community must be taken into
account. In totality, the ICWA seeks to preserve, whenever possible, Indian
culture by both limiting state jurisdiction over dependency proceedings and
bolstering tribal authority.100 The Act pursues these goals through both
procedural requirements on parties in state courts, and substantive
requirements on social service agencies and courts.101 Despite these efforts,
ambiguities still linger at the state level.
C. US Supreme Court Clarification of the ICWA: Mississippi v. Holyfield
Only once has the US Supreme Court specifically addressed the ICWA.
In the 1988 case of Mississippi v. Holyfield, the Court attempted to clarify
some ambiguities in the 1978 version of the ICWA.102 The Court affirmed
the scope of tribal jurisdiction under the ICWA, holding that tribal courts
have default and exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
involving Indian children who are either domiciled, or reside, on a
reservation.103 This case arose out of definitional ambiguity, as the ICWA
did not initially define “domicile.”104 The Court in Holyfield, therefore, set
forth a narrow definition of “domicile” under the ICWA in an attempt to
address the application of the Act across the nation.105
Holyfield involved Jennie Bell, a member of the federally recognized
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and her biological children.106 Ms.
Bell was a “twenty-four year old single mother of two, and she was
pregnant with twins by a man who was married to another woman and [had]
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two children of his own.”107 Due to these circumstances, Ms. Bell sought to
relinquish her twins for adoption to Orrey and Vivian Joan Holyfield, a
non-Indian couple living on non-Indian land.108 Ms. Bell gave birth to the
twins in a hospital 200 miles from the Choctaw reservation and executed a
consent form to relinquish her parental rights to the Holyfields.109 The
ICWA was not applied.110 However, the Choctaw Tribe filed suit against
the Holyfields four years later stating that, although the children were born
off of Indian land, the tribe should have had jurisdiction under the ICWA.111
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter and addressed the
questions of whether the twins were ever “domiciled” on the Choctaw
reservation, and whether the ICWA provisions should have applied.112 The
Court held the twins shared the domicile of their mother, despite the fact
that they were born off-reservation.113 Thus, the Court granted the tribe
jurisdiction.114
In reaching this determination, the Court focused on the congressional
intent for enacting the ICWA. In particular, the Court relied on the ICWA’s
purpose to “establish a federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child
should remain in the Indian community” and ensure that “Indian child
welfare determinations are not based on a white, middle-class standard
which, in many cases, forecloses placement with an Indian family.”115
Additionally, the Court articulated an aversion to non-Indian involvement
in Indian child custody proceedings, stating that “the very text of the
ICWA” along with “its legislative history and the hearings that led to its
107

Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1.
Id.
109
Id. at 30.
110
See id. at 53.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 37.
108

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013

1248 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

enactment” illustrated that “Congress was concerned with the rights of
Indian families and Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”116 In
this manner, the Court emphasized the need for national compliance, and
adherence to the ICWA provisions, in individual states to ensure deference
to tribal protection of heritage and family connections. While the Court has
not granted certiorari to any other case involving the ICWA since Holyfield,
in that case, it unequivocally acknowledged the federal government’s
recognition of tribal sovereignty and authority in Indian child welfare
matters.
D. Specific ICWA Provisions
The specific provisions of the ICWA are only triggered if two conditions
are met.117 First, the state action must be under the scope of the ICWA’s
definition of a “child custody proceeding.”118 Under the ICWA, this
definition includes voluntary and involuntary foster care placement, preadoptive and adoptive placement, and any other state action that results in
the termination of parental rights.119 Excluded from this ICWA provision
are matters of juvenile delinquency and divorce custody actions.120 Second,
the provisions of the ICWA only apply to a particular proceeding if that
proceeding involves an Indian child.121 Under the ICWA, an “Indian child”
is defined as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”122
To meet this requirement, one must show proof of membership in an Indian
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tribe.123 The ICWA, similar to other federal statutes involving tribes,
defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the
services provided by Indians by the Secretary [of the Interior] because of
their status as Indians.”124 From these definitions, only federally recognized
tribes and their members are protected under the ICWA.
In order to accomplish the dual goals of limiting state jurisdiction and
strengthening tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, the
ICWA has several main provisions:
 Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over any Indian child
custody proceeding when that child either resides or is domiciled
on an Indian reservation. If the Indian child resides off the
reservation, “the court, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the
tribe.” Absent an objection by the parents or the Indian tribe, both
the tribal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. However,
there is a preference in these cases for tribal jurisdiction.125
 Notice must be given to both the Indian child’s birth parent(s) or
custodian(s) as well as the Indian child’s tribe before an
involuntary custody proceeding can begin in state court.126
 A strong preference is articulated for matters involving ICWA
children to be resolved in tribal court. State courts must transfer
cases involving Indian children to a tribal court if either the
parent, the Indian custodian, or the Indian child’s tribe petitions
such a transfer. A state court is only able to overcome this petition
if there is a “good cause to the contrary,” or if either parent
objects.127
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 If jurisdiction is not transferred to tribal court, a state court is
held to high standards regarding both foster care placement and
the termination of parental rights. For a state court to place an
Indian child into non-Indian foster care, the state must submit
clear and convincing evidence that failure to remove the child
from his or her environment is likely to result in serious physical
or emotional damage to the child.128 For a state court to terminate
the parental right of an Indian child, the state must show proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that failure to do so will result in
serious physical or emotional harm to the child.129 Additionally,
any party, such as a state agency, seeking foster care placement or
termination of parental rights must provide proof of active efforts
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.130
 Voluntary termination of parental rights by an Indian parent
requires court certification that the parent fully understands the
consequence of such a procedure. The parent can withdraw this
consent to termination at any time.131
 Regarding placement of an Indian child after parental rights have
been terminated, particular preferences must be adhered to. In
“absence of good cause to the contrary,” the state’s placement for
an Indian child must be in accordance with these priorities: (a) a
member of the child’s extended family, (b) other members of the
Indian child’s tribe, and then, (c) other Indian families.132
Furthermore, if a child is placed in foster care or preadoptive
placement, the Indian child must be placed within “a reasonable
proximity” to the child’s home in the “least restrictive setting”
that most approximates a family.133
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 If the state court violates any of the ICWA provisions, a petition
from the child’s parents, custodian, or tribe can invalidate the
child’s placement.134
Therefore, in light of these provisions, if a child is deemed Indian under
the definitional terms of the statute, the state must take additional steps
before removing the child by determining proper jurisdiction, including the
child’s tribe as a party in the case, and meeting a higher burden. These
provisions were enacted with the goals of protecting Indian children and
Indian tribes from needless state action regarding child removal.
E. The “Active Efforts” Standard in the ICWA
Including the general provisions outlined above, the ICWA outlines an
additional standard state agencies must meet in order to remove an ICWA
child from his or her home. This additional standard is set forth in Section
1912(d), which states the following:
[A]ny party seeking to effect a foster care placement of,
or termination of parental rights to, any Indian child under
State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts
[emphasis added] have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts
have proved unsuccessful.135
In this provision of the ICWA, states have adopted a wide range of
interpretations as they struggle to define the standard that applicable state
agencies must meet in order to prove that adequate “active efforts” have
been made to keep the child with his or her birth family. In other words,
states have continued to wrestle with the following question: how much
work, or effort, must a state social worker do or put in to preserve the
Indian child’s existing family structure?
134
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Since there is no statutory clarification in the ICWA as to the definition
of “active efforts,” or instruction of how a state can meet the standard of
sufficient “active efforts,” this portion of the ICWA has proven particularly
problematic. In California and Colorado, courts have stated that “active
efforts” are equivalent to “reasonable efforts”—the same standard used for
non-ICWA child custody proceedings.136 Conversely, courts in Utah and
Oklahoma have interpreted “active efforts” to mean more than “reasonable
efforts.”137 Thus far, no national clarification or consensus exists on exactly
what “active efforts” means for a social worker or a similarly situated state
official involved in an Indian child custody proceeding.
In 2002, the National Indian Child Welfare Association released a
detailed and comprehensive report highlighting the state of Arizona’s
compliance to the ICWA, which illustrated the continued confusion over
the definition of “active efforts.”138 The report included a “focus group”
component where state agency child welfare professionals discussed the
difference between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts.”139 The results
of this professional group discussion indicated the following:
[N]o general consensus was reached as to whether or not “active
efforts” require[s] a different standard of proof. [S]ome believed
that “active” and “reasonable” are equivalent, but others indicated
that active efforts require a higher legal standard. Most agreed that
no clear definition exists for either active or reasonable efforts.140
Ultimately, the report concluded the following:
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[A]mong state and tribal representatives, no agreement exists as to
the meaning of active efforts. . . . Workers have no clear guidelines
for active efforts to develop and implement case plans, and the
state court has no systematic way of ruling on the application of
active efforts with Indian families.141
In other words, the agency professionals tasked with adhering to the
ICWA’s “active efforts” standard were not collectively able to determine
what this standard meant.
The problem of defining “active efforts” extends to other states beyond
Arizona. In 2000, North Dakota published a study regarding its own ICWA
compliance.142 This study revealed that only 66 percent of its ICWA child
custody cases contained documentation of “active efforts.”143 The most
egregious finding was the wide disparity between ICWA and “active
efforts” compliance across different county and regional lines—there was
simply no uniform implementation whatsoever.144 Similar to Arizona, state
agencies and their legal teams in North Dakota are left to decide for
themselves what constitutes an “active effort” without a clear national
definition of what this entails. Therefore, significant differences and
deviations exist in implementing the ICWA across the states.
F. Compliance with the ICWA: Does the Act Really Accomplish its Goals?
The application and implementation of the ICWA in state courts on a
national level has been uneven and problematic, due in part to the uncertain
meaning of “active efforts.” In fact, some argue the goals of ICWA—to
bolster tribal sovereignty and preserve Indian culture through Indian
children—“[have] proven to be illusory and the goal of uniformity a
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farce.”145 In an attempt to circumnavigate the ICWA provisions, some states
have created exceptions and loopholes to the ICWA that “have render[ed]
many of its provisions superfluous.”146
In particular, states have eroded the strength of the ICWA and tribal
sovereignty in these proceedings by expanding the “existing Indian family”
exception and refusing to comply with the strict standards articulated in the
ICWA.147 In the “existing Indian family” doctrine, an exception is created
to the application of ICWA and its provisions when an Indian child, “has
never resided with an Indian family.”148 While the Supreme Court in
Holyfield seemed to discredit this doctrine and its ruling, several state
courts have found ways to continue to implement this exception. Through
this exception, these states are, “able to question the ability of tribal courts
and social service agencies to effectively provide for the best interests of
Indian children,” and in doing so, turn “the congressional presumption in
favor of tribal court decision-making on its head.”149
These concerns about ICWA compliance have manifested in numerous
states, but in particular, South Dakota.150 In South Dakota, according to a
2011 study, Indian children make up less than 15 percent of the child
population, yet make up more than half of the children in foster care.151 In
fact, in 2010 alone, more than 700 Indian children were removed from their
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homes.152 In one particular tribe—the Crow Creek with only 1,400
members—thirty-three children have been removed over the last couple
years.153 In light of these numbers, it is questionable whether the goal of
preserving Indian culture and heritage by keeping Indian children in Indian
families is being met on a national level.

IV. THE ICWA AND WASHINGTON STATE: 1978 TO 2011
The ICWA’s application in Washington is unique and interesting due to
several factors. First, Washington has addressed, and continues to default,
state and tribal jurisdictional issues in a distinctive and different legal
framework called “Public Law 280.”154 Second, Washington courts have
specifically rejected an interpretation of an ICWA provision, called the
“existing family exception,” that other state courts have adopted.155
Nonetheless, despite Washington’s general policy of upholding tribal rights
and culture, ICWA compliance in Washington has been lacking, and the
racial disproportion of Indian children in the foster care system has
continued.156
A. Washington as a “Public Law 280” State
The application and adherence to the ICWA is complicated in
Washington because it is categorized as a “Public Law 280” state.157 In a
Public Law 280 state, the state government has jurisdictional authority over
152
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the tribes in certain areas, despite the nineteenth century cases in the federal
Indian law canon.158
In the 1950s, the national Indian policy was centered on the goals of
termination and destruction of tribal sovereignty.159 In line with this
viewpoint, Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953160 to “deal with the
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations and the absence of
adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.”161 Concretely, Public Law
280 declared that in six states, state jurisdiction extended over Indian
reservations.162
At the time of Public Law 280’s enactment, Washington had a specific
disclaimer in its state constitution that Indians “shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.”163
Although Public Law 280’s extension of state jurisdiction over Indian
territory was in direct conflict with this language, Public Law 280 was
enacted in Washington. From this enactment, Washington took over civil
and criminal jurisdiction on Indian land via laws passed in 1957 and
1963.164
The effects of this take over were mitigated in March 2012 when the
Washington legislature approved House Bill 2233, which provides an
avenue for Indian tribes to assume jurisdiction over their lands that are
currently held by the state under Public Law 280.165 While this brand new
law has yet to be fully tested in practice, it appears Indian tribes may,
through a variety of procedural maneuvers, be able to petition the state
158
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government for “retrocede” jurisdiction on tribal land.166 Nevertheless,
Washington enacted a state ICWA, not only because of its issues in
adhering to the federal ICWA, but also because it wanted to retain some
jurisdiction over tribal land and affairs under Public Law 280.167
B. Rejection of “Existing Indian Family” Doctrine by the Washington
Legislature
Another issue regarding the ICWA in Washington has been the
application and subsequent rejection of the “existing Indian family”
doctrine. The “existing Indian family” doctrine is an exception to the
provisions in the ICWA.168 Some states have used this exception as a
loophole to avoid applying the ICWA provisions and standards to particular
child custody proceedings.169 This exception applies when the state finds
that the child in question is not a part of an “existing Indian family” and,
therefore, ICWA’s provisions do not apply.170
The “existing Indian family” exception arose from Baby Boy L., a famous
Kansas Supreme Court decision.171 In that case, the Kansas court found the
provisions of the ICWA did not apply to an adoption proceeding of a child
who had a non-Indian birth mother and an Indian birth father.172 In Baby
Boy L., the child had never lived with his Indian birth father.173 The nonIndian birth mother sought to voluntarily place her child for adoption with a
non-Indian couple.174 The Kansas court found that the legislative intent of
ICWA was to prevent the breakup of Indian families; because the child had
166
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never lived in an Indian home, an Indian family would not be broken up
and, therefore, the ICWA did not apply.175 Baby Boy L. was a seminal case
for ICWA litigation because the Kansas court relied entirely on an
interpretation of the legislative intent of the ICWA and ignored the literal
application—that the adoption placement was a “child custody proceeding”
under the Act’s terms, and the child in question was an “Indian” child under
the Act’s definitions.176 Many argue that the “existing Indian family”
exception is an attempt to erode the authority and sovereignty given to
tribes through the ICWA.177
Ten years after Baby Boy L. was decided, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the “existing Indian family” exception in its first ICWA case.178 In
deciding In re Crews, the Court was faced with a situation where a tribe
was contesting the adoption of a baby boy who was born to parents who, at
the time of adoption, claimed to have no Indian heritage.179 However, after
the boy was placed in the custody of the adoptive parents, the mother
attempted to regain parental custody through the ICWA by stating that the
boy was, in fact, an “Indian child.”180 She claimed that the boy was
considered an “Indian child” due to the fact that the Choctaw Nation in
Oklahoma now verified that she was a member of that tribe.181 In its
holding, the In re Crews Court found the child was not an “Indian child”
under the definitional terms of the ICWA because the case fell within the
“existing Indian family” exception.182 The Court reasoned that, since
neither the mother nor the father were culturally Indian, the child would not
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be raised culturally Indian if he were to return to his biological parents, and
that this situation fell outside the intended scope of the ICWA.183
Specifically, the court found that:
[T]here is no allegation by [the mother] or the Choctaw
Nation that, if custody were returned to [the mother], [the
child] would grow up in an Indian environment. To the
contrary, [the mother] has shown no substantive interest
in her Indian heritage in the past and has given no
indication this will change in the future. While [the child]
may be an “Indian child” based on the Choctaw
Constitution, we do not find an existing Indian family
unit or environment from which [the child] was removed
or to which he would be returned. To apply ICWA in this
specific situation would not further the policies and
purposes of ICWA.184
In this manner, the Washington Supreme Court, in its first case concerning
the ICWA, limited and quantified the scope of the ICWA, as well as made
specific determinations about the required character and form of tribal
membership.
While many courts—most predominantly two appellate divisions in
California—have upheld the “existing Indian family” exception doctrine in
ICWA cases, the Washington legislature statutorily invalidated the holding
of In re Crews in 2004.185 Washington is now among the vast majority of
states who have, either by case law or statute, explicitly rejected the
“existing Indian family” exception as a means to circumnavigate the
application of the ICWA provisions.186 However, this exception is still
followed in Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee.187 In this manner,
183
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Washington has demonstrated its ability and willingness to move toward
greater adherence to the intent of the ICWA.
C. Continued Racial Disproportionality in Washington’s Child Welfare
System
Despite progressive efforts by Washington courts to enforce the ICWA in
rejecting the “existing family doctrine,” a disproportional number of Indian
children still remain in Washington’s child welfare system.188 This
disproportion was outlined in a study published by the Washington State
Institute for Public Policy in June 2008 that followed 58,005 children from
2004 to 2007.189 The study found that, in Washington, Indian children were
three times more likely to be referred to CPS than white children.190 This
rate is higher than black children (twice as likely as white children),
Hispanic children (1.3 times as likely as white children), and Asian children
(less likely than white children).191 In reference to removal from the family,
Indian children were 1.6 times more likely to be removed from their home
than white children, and were twice as likely to remain in foster care for
over two years.192 These numbers are also higher than black, Hispanic, and
Asian children.193
In addition to these shocking figures, the report also discussed
contributing factors to these statistics and general conclusions by racial
grouping. First, the Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and
Neglect found that there was a strong correlation between family poverty
and child maltreatment.194 In 2004, 332,100 Washington children lived in
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households receiving food stamps, representing 24 percent of all the
children in Washington.195 Furthermore, children with CPS referrals
represent 7 percent of all children receiving food stamps in that year.196
Second, family structure has a positive correlation to CPS referrals in
Washington. For example, while only 18 percent of white children in
Washington live in a single parent home, 74 percent of white children in
foster care lived in a single parent home at the time of removal.197
Finally, the study stated key findings for each racial group in
Washington’s child welfare system. In comparison with white children,
Indian children referred to CPS contained the following characteristics: (1)
they were less likely to have a referral accepted; (2) they were more likely
to have a high risk tag at intake; (3) they were more likely to be removed
from home if they had a high risk tag at intake; (4) they were as likely to
remain in care for over sixty days if removed from the home; and (5) they
were more likely to remain in care for two years. 198
In December of 2008, the Statewide Racial Disproportionality Advisory
Committee published its action plan in response to the above report-—the
Racial Disproportionality and Disparity in Washington State Child Welfare
Remediation Plan.199 In this plan, the committee recommended to the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) Secretary several
provisions to combat this extreme disproportionality.200 One of the two
recommendations articulated by this committee is stated as follows:
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[S]ubstantial amounts of racial disproportionality exist
within the Washington State American Indian population.
Emphasis on Indian Child Welfare compliance will be a
priority [emphasis added]. Also, in-depth look at how
racial disproportionality varies between Reservation
Indians, Rural Indians, and Urban Indians.201
In 2010, the Washington State Racial Disproportionality Advisory
Committee published another report to the legislature concerning the
findings from the 2008 Washington State Institute for Public Policy
report.202 This publication also included historical data on the removal of
Indian children from their families in Washington.203 In 1975, prior to the
passage of the ICWA, the American Indian foster care placement rate to
Non-Indian families was 34.92 per 1,000 children in Washington.204 After
the ICWA was enacted, the rate dropped to 18.24 per 1,000 children in
1979.205 Similarly, the rate for Indian adoptions in 1975, before the ICWA,
was 3.0 per 1,000 children.206 After the passage of the ICWA, in 1986, this
rate dropped to 0.11 per 1,000 children.207 As a result, the committee
recommended that further compliance with the ICWA was needed to
continue to address the high rate of Indian children in Washington’s child
welfare system.208
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In particular, the committee specifically recommended an enactment of a
Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act.209 This report stated the
following:
DSHS should study the impact that state-level Indian Child
Welfare Acts have had in states that have implemented such state
ICW legislation [and] if the study finds that implementation of
state-level legislation increases compliance with the core tenants
of ICW [Indian Child Welfare] and reduces racial
disproportionality, DSHS should support enactment of a
Washington State ICWA.210

V. WASHINGTON’S INDIAN CHILD WELFARE (WICWA)
In response to these reports and recommendations, in April 2011, the
Washington
legislature
passed
Senate
Bill
5656—
211
WICWA. In May 2011, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire signed
this bill into law, which was later codified as RCW 13.38.212 WICWA is
designed to apply specifically to RCW 13.34—child custody proceedings
involving the state.213 The WICWA is intended to provide the following: (1)
clarify Washington’s interpretation of the federal ICWA;214 (2) assure
quicker, more accurate identification of Indian children in the child welfare
system; (3) assure consistent application and enforcement of the federal
ICWA; (4) assure existing policies, practices, and agreements developed
over the last several years between the state and the tribes of Washington
are the benchmarks against which federal ICWA compliance is measured;
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and (5) better define the types of “child custody” cases affected by federal
and state Indian child welfare laws.215
By adopting the federal ICWA as state law, the Washington legislature
attempted to bring greater clarification and, therefore, greater adherence to
the application of the ICWA. By attempting to execute these goals, the
legislature has failed to clarify a key provision of the federal statute—
“active efforts.” However, it has succeeded in defining another key
provision: “the best interest of the child” in adherence to tribal
sovereignty.216
A. Clarification of “Active Efforts”
Under the WICWA, the ICWA term, “active efforts,” is given some
definitional clarity; however, this clarification is not enough. The “active
efforts” standard refers to the minimum amount of work that a state agency
or its employees, such as social workers, must do in attempting to prevent
the removal of an Indian child from an Indian home.217 As discussed above,
there has been widespread confusion about heightened standards in the
ICWA, and the difference, if any, between the non-ICWA standard of
“reasonable efforts” and the ICWA standard of “active efforts.” The
Washington legislature attempted to address this confusion by defining
“active efforts” in RCW 13.38.040(1).218 However, this standard is still
ambiguous and difficult for state agents to navigate.
Under RCW 13.38.040(1), at a minimum, “active efforts” must include
the following:
 In any dependency proceeding under chapter 13.34 RCW seeking
out-of-home placement of an Indian child in which the
department or supervising agency provided voluntary services to
215
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the parent, parents, or Indian custodian prior to filing the
dependency petition, a showing to the court that the department or
supervising agency social workers actively worked with the
parent, parents, or Indian custodian to engage them in remedial
services and rehabilitation programs to prevent the breakup of the
family beyond simply providing referrals to such services
[emphasis added].
 In any dependency proceeding under chapter 13.34 RCW, in
which the petitioner is seeking the continued out-of-home
placement of an Indian child, the department or supervising
agency must show to the court that it has actively worked with the
parent, parents, or Indian custodian in accordance with existing
court orders and the individual service plan to engage them in
remedial services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the
breakup of the family beyond simply providing referrals to such
services [emphasis added].
 In any termination of parental rights proceeding regarding an
Indian child under chapter 13.34 RCW in which the department
or supervising agency provided services to the parent, parents, or
Indian custodian, a showing to the court that the department or
supervising agency social workers actively worked with the
parent, parents, or Indian custodian to engage them in remedial
services and rehabilitation programs ordered by the court or
identified in the department or supervising agency’s individual
service and safety plan beyond simply providing referrals to such
services [emphasis added].219
In comparison to the ICWA of 1978, which provided no guidance as to
the specific actions required to meet the “active efforts” burden of proof
standard, the WICWA does clarify that “active efforts” must constitute
something more than “simply providing referrals to such services.”220
However, this vague definition does not provide enough clarity for social
work professionals. The range of possible functions “beyond simply
219
220
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providing referrals to such services” is endless. Is it enough for a social
worker to simply spend more time on an ICWA case? If so, how much
time? Must the social worker physically drive a family member to the
service provider? Must the social worker attend a particular appointment?
How much follow up, if any, is required? These are questions social
workers confront each day as they attempt to adhere to the WICWA in their
work.
Although stating that “active efforts” means something beyond a referral
is a step in the right direction, this action is still not sufficient to fill the gap
of understanding and clarity that currently exists among state agencies and
associated personnel. In order to sufficiently clarify “active efforts,”
Washington must provide tangible examples of these efforts. Jurisdictions
such as California have provided such tangible examples in their training
materials of how active efforts differ from reasonable efforts.221 These
training tools include several pages of concrete, practical hypotheticals in
which the distinctions between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts” are
clarified for social workers.222 For instance, giving contact information to a
parent for parenting classes would satisfy the social worker’s obligation for
under “reasonable efforts” while, in order to meet the “active efforts”
standard, the social worker would need to actually sign the parents up for
parenting classes at a local Native American health center and arrange
transportation to the classes.223 In another concrete example, giving a family
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Family) sign-up materials would
meet “reasonable efforts”, while actually signing up the family for TANF
and staying in regular contact with TANF providers meets “active
221

THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS,
ADVANCED INDIAN CHILD WELFARE CURRICULUM: TRAINEE’S GUIDE 23, available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/TribalTraineesGuide.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2013).
222
Id. at 23-25
223
Id.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Do We Have It Right This Time? 1267

efforts.”224 Washington courts must provide similar training materials, but
more importantly, include such examples in the statutory language. Without
this clarification, definitions and standards of the required “active efforts”
are left to agency committees and trainers’ discretion, not the legislature.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the intent of the ICWA and
the WICWA is to preserve tribal culture and heritage.225 Therefore, any
“active efforts” by state social workers must fit within this framework.
Social workers must be required to utilize services and resources that are
culturally sensitive to the tribal member. The Washington legislature should
expand the “active efforts” clarification in the WICWA to include both
tangible examples of these “active efforts” and preferential language for
services and resources with Indian cultural focuses.
B. The “Best Interests of the Child”
While the Washington legislature did not provide sufficiently helpful
language in its definition of “active efforts” in the WICWA, it did provide
clarification and guidance for culturally-related resources regarding “the
best interests of the child.”226 The recent passage of the WICWA, in
addition to the ICWA, must be understood through the complicated and
intersected role of race and power. Therefore, clarifying vague definitional
terms, like the “best interests of the child,” with culturally-focused
terminology through the WICWA is a step in the right direction. In this
pursuit, it is also important to address and understand the role race plays in
these proceedings and how issues of race, culture, and privilege are infused
in this debate.227 To ignore these larger contextual issues is to ignore the
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root of the problem. In particular, the “best interest of the child” standard in
the ICWA is a pivotal topic in this discussion.
The “best interest of the child” is a core doctrine in American legal
theory, especially relating to family matters. In essence, the “best interest of
the child” test has the dual goal of “avoiding placement of a child with an
individual who is unfit” and also “seeking to choose otherwise fit
individuals.”228 This Anglo-American test can be distilled to
essentially middle class values to determine what setting will serve
to protect the child from physical and emotional injury on the one
hand and to better the child physically, emotionally, and
educationally on the other. While racial, ethnic, and religious
factors may play a role in determining placements [for children],
they are secondary in importance.229
Under the WICWA, it is clear that the legislature is concerned with the
best interest of the individual child in question as it utilizes this standard
family law test.230 However, WICWA proceedings are unique from other
child custody proceedings in that the best interests of the child are also
intertwined with the best interests of the tribe, culture, and family.231 The
WICWA rejects the Anglo middle-class standard of the best interest of the
child present in non-ICWA child custody proceedings and instead considers
this standard along with other tribal and community health concerns.232
Since the very intent of the ICWA and the WICWA is to reduce the
destruction of Indian heritage through the removal of Indian children,
Indian heritage and culture must be brought into the discussion when
considering what the best interests of the child actually are. The
228
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Washington legislature was relatively successful in bringing these
considerations into the law’s construction.
All too often in ICWA cases, the middle-class, Anglo-Christian
viewpoint of what is best for the child dictates the outcome of the case. In
these cases, the standard applied by the courts is what individuals or context
will provide the child with the closest adherence to a middle-class, AngloChristian life. This judicial reasoning in child custody proceedings is
contradictory to the legislative intent and purpose of the federal and state
ICWA provisions. However, under new statutory language in the WICWA,
the best interests of the child standard is defined as follows:
[T]he use of practices in accordance with the federal Indian child
welfare act…that are designed to accomplish the following: (a)
protect the safety, well-being, development, and stability of the
Indian child; (b) prevent the unnecessary out-of-home placement
of the Indian child; (c) acknowledge the right of Indian tribes to
maintain their existence and integrity which will promote the
stability and security of their children and families;
(d) recognize the value to the Indian child of establishing,
developing, or maintaining a political, cultural, social, and spiritual
relationship with the Indian child’s tribe and tribal community; and
(e) in a proceeding under this chapter where out-of-home
placement is necessary, to prioritize placement of the Indian child
in accordance with the placement preferences of this chapter.233
Through this statutory language, the legislature has clearly articulated the
central goal of the WICWA—to preserve Indian culture. Therefore,
Washington courts, when applying the WICWA, must also consider and
adhere to this goal. In order for the WICWA to be truly effective in the
Washington court system and protect Indian children from removal from
their families, Washington courts must embrace and adhere to the specific
language and legislative intent of the WICWA.
233
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VI. CONCLUSION
Washington’s recent adoption of the ICWA as state law is an important
step towards strengthening tribal authority and sovereignty in child custody
proceedings of Indian children. Previously, the specific provisions of the
ICWA, including the “active efforts” standard and the “best interest of the
child” philosophy, were not entirely understood or followed in Washington.
The WICWA has the opportunity to correct these issues. Under the
WICWA, the legislature did a relatively good job of adopting a clear
definition of the “best interest of the child” that bolsters the core policy of
the ICWA. However, the legislature failed to adequately define in concrete
terms and tangible examples the “active efforts” standard.
In order to ensure state agencies and their employees adhere to the intent
of the WICWA in both its substantive and procedural provisions, the
language of this statute must be more clear, concrete, and useful to the
average social worker. Only with tangible examples of the standards can
ICWA’s goals be realized in Washington through the WICWA. Non-legal
professionals must be given concrete and culturally sensitive resources and
education about the history of Indian child removal in the United States, as
well as easily implementable standards, to prevent similar harm to ensure
Indian children in Washington are not needlessly removed from their
families.
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